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Foucault's Move beyond the Theoretical 
Ladelle McWhorter 
Theory plays an important role in virtually every academic discipline 
currently vital. The specific functions of theory may differ from discipline 
to discipline, but it is difficult to think of any serious discipline that is able 
to dispense with it entirely; -for theory, we usually assume, is quite simply 
the name of all instances of systematic speculation, all attempts at rational 
explication. Ordered mentation, most of us unwaveringly believe, is and 
must be theoretical. All that is not theoretical is either confused thinking-
or, more positively, perhaps it is poetic-or it is not thinking at all, but 
rather a practice, object, or event. Thus the theoretical discloses itself to 
us as the essential nature of all our striving to make sense of ourselves and 
our world. 
It is odd, then, that the word theory should be all but absent from the 
work of Michel Foucault. And yet absent it is, at every juncture where 
custom compels us to expect it to appear. When Foucault discourses at great 
length on knowledge, systems of knowledge, and various interpretations of 
what it is to know, we might expect him to offer us a new theory of knowl-
edge, but he does not do that. Again, his detailed study of power (which 
appears in La Volante de savoir and is referred to by many commentators as 
a theory) Foucault names not "theory" but "analytics"; 1 and in an inter-
view with Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, he insists that his ideas on 
power "represent neither a theory nor a methodology."2 His accounts of the 
development of subjectivities likewise yield not a theory of the subject-
although, again, some commentators have called it that-but rather an odd 
collection of ordered insights that Foucault prefers to call, a lti Nietzsche, 
genealogies. 
In light of this, one might suppose that Foucault simply harbors an 
irrational dislike of theory as a word. One might suppose that his works, 
though theoretical in nature, simply do not choose to announce themselves 
that way. Thus, commentators have either overlooked or disregarded 
Foucault's avoidance of the word theory; and some have simply supplied it 
in their studies of his work. Consequently, analyses of Foucault's social 
theories, political theories, and theories of language abound. 
197 
198 LADELLE MCWHORTER 
However, instead of assuming that Foucault's work-systematic, spec-
ulative, and explicative as it is-is, regardless of his sometimes perhaps 
rather eccentric terminology, theoretical, let us suppose for the moment that 
Foucault's avoidance of the word theory is indicative of a rejection of the-
oretical thought, of a conscious, intentional, premeditated dethroning of the 
theoretical gaze. Let us, in other words, take Foucault's vocabulary seri-
ously and address directly the question that theory's absence raises. Why 
not theory? In what sense is theory at odds with the aims of Michel 
Foucault? That is the question this paper purposes to answer. 
There are several points of entry into Foucault's discourse. One way to 
begin to engage his work-the way that I have chosen to begin here-is to 
situate it in opposition to transcendentality. Foucault is interested in think-
ing the world thoroughly historically, without reference to any metaphysical 
structure, without recourse to any transhistorical constant. In particular, 
Foucault is interested in understanding human subjectivities, human self-
hoods, historically, as the ever-changeable products of traceable sets of his-
torical forces. 3 Foucault takes Nietzsche at his word when Nietzsche speaks 
in Beyond Good and Evil of the "I" that occurs within thinking and that in 
its arrogance then posits itself as the cause of the very matrix-thinking-
from which it arises.4 Foucault's explicit task is to understand the processes 
that formed and subsequently inform this self-proclaimed agency, this "1," 
the self-conscious individual, the subject of knowledge, action, and moral 
responsibility. 
But early in the attempt a problem arises. The "I" that posits itself as 
the cause of thought also traditionally has posited itself as the source and 
owner of force, of power. Therefore, reversing the traditional priority of 
subjectivity and power-which Foucault must do if he is to understand sub-
jectivities as occurrences within history-will require a reconceptualization 
of power, one in which power operates without essential reference 
to human agency. It is this reconceptualization that Foucault christens 
"analytics." 
But why is analytics not a theory? The answer is fairly simple, though 
the reasoning behind it is somewhat more complex. We must remember that 
with Foucault we are in a discourse that rejects transcendentality and re-
fuses to grant privilege to subjectivity. These stances, as we shall see, entail 
opposition to theory, for theoretical thinking is intimately associated both 
with privileged observation and with transcendental truth. 
Theory's alliance with privileged observation has been duly noted and 
fretted over at least since the end of the nineteenth century. Various reme-
dies have been proposed with varying degrees of acceptance and success, 
but these debates will not concern us here. What has been problematized 
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less often is theory's alliance with transcendental structure, the ahistoricity 
of its commitments and goals. We will examine this more carefully. 
Theoretical work presupposes truth. One purpose, perhaps the main 
purpose, of theory is to render accessible-to capture in symbol, in lan-
guage-the structure of the true. Whether the object in question is patterns 
of economic development, DNA replication, the sociology of warfare, or 
the creation of the world, theoretical discourse locates its target and at-
tempts to seize it, to import it intact and alive into a linguistic structure that 
will display its complex order, its inner logic or form. To a very great ex-
tent, within theoretical discourse particular theories are measured against 
the reality that they purport to explicate. Theoretical discourses assume that 
there is a truth of DNA replication, that there is a truth of world creation. 
The theory that most adequately represents this truth is itself derivatively 
called true, or is at least tentatively treated as true until a "better" account 
presents itself. All other theories are held to be inferior to the one (or in 
some cases, the few) that most closely matches the reality with which it is 
concerned. The remaining untrue, or inferior, theories are usually 
discarded. 5 There is, then, so we are told, a kind of theoretic competition 
in which there are winners and losers, and, at the best of times-times 
unmarred by political maneuver or religious dogma-the judge in these 
games is truth, truth itself, the way things really are. 
This is theoretical discourse's own account of itself. It understands it-
self to be a kind of game, albeit with a very serious purpose and very high 
stakes. If this self-portrait is accurate, then it would be reasonable to pre-
dict that theoretical discourse deprived of truth as both prize and judge 
would collapse into dramatic disarray. Without truth, theoretical thought 
would have no goal. It would be directionless or, what amounts to the same 
thing, multi-directional. Hence, competition among theories would be 
meaningless, for truth serves theory as its principle of valuational arrange-
ment. In the absence of truth no theory could be disqualified from the field 
of play; no theory could be eliminated from consideration. Nor would any 
particular theory be able to command our assent. In theoretical discourse 
(to paraphrase Dostoevsky) without truth anything is possible. And the re-
sult is discursive chaos. 
Before going on to link traditional conceptions of truth with ahistoric-
ity, which is of course one of the objects of this paper, it is important to 
insert a slightly peripheral comment. There are those who contend that 
truth is not an essential element of theory for the simple reason that truth 
can never be attained. Our finitude hobbles us; truth is forever beyond our 
reach, and therefore it is external to theoretical discourse. Nevertheless, 
these thinkers would have us note that theoretical discourse is orderly, even 
200 LADELLE MCWHORTER 
in truth's absence. Theory deprived of truth simply proceeds according to 
the principle of approximation. Though we remain always at an unbridge-
able distance from our goal, each of our theoretical improvements yields a 
"closer" approximation to truth. 
This alternative account of theoretical thought, it is important to see, 
does not really dispense with truth. Like its more optimistic counterpart, it 
posits a truth, but a truth that it then projects-here using that word in a 
quasi-psychological sense-outside the theoretical domain. Nevertheless, 
truth still functions as the internal ordering principle of theoretical dis-
course. Theory still structures itself with reference to some truth, despite its 
insistence that this truth is "out there" rather than within the discourse 
itself. Hence, this second account does not differ from the more commonly 
accepted account in its description of theoretical discourse's internal struc-
ture, the aspect of the discourse of concern to us here. Like the first ac-
count, it describes theoretical endeavors as contests or games that are 
dependent upon the concept, though perhaps not the acknowledged and tan-
gible presence, of truth. Therefore, what we might call the Peircean account 
of theory really differs from the other account only in its degree of pessi-
mism regarding the ultimate agonistic outcome. 
By its own account, then, theory takes its meaning from its presuppo-
sition of truth. As a result, the degree to which theory is bound up with 
transcendental thought depends upon the degree of transcendentality that 
we assign to truth. The question we now must ask is whether truth tran-
scends history, whether history simply flows past an undisturbed and undis-
turbable truth. 
In the Platonic tradition the answer is, of course, affirmative. The true 
is Being, never Becoming. Truth does not change; it is perfect, and its sta-
sis is the hallmark of its perfection. 
It was the Greeks who gave us theory, the Greeks with their emphasis 
upon seeing-as opposed to hearing, touching, tasting, smelling-the 
Greeks and their love affair with wisdom, their mania for rational contem-
plation conceived as a kind of nonphysical beholding of the changeless 
world beyond this realm of dancing shadows and decaying apparitions. In 
the tradition we might somewhat loosely term Socratic or Platonic, theory 
is profoundly ahistorical, for the truth it seeks is always understood as 
timeless. 
But, surely, truth has matured since then. Some theorists would insist 
that truth has broken its infantile ties with transcendence and has histori-
cized itself. In what may be loosely termed the Hegelian tradition, the true 
is precisely the historical itself; it is identified with the changing world. 
Consequently, these thinkers would assure us, Foucault the historical 
thinker need not be wary of theory in this tradition. And if he is, he simply 
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has not been generous or thorough enough in his study of theory's transfor-
mations. He has failed to recognize theory in its historicity, in its change-
ableness. Foucault the self-proclaimed historical thinker has rejected theory 
only by overlooking its developmental nature in Hegelian thought. At this 
point, much to the delight of his critics, Foucault seems to be caught in a 
trap of his own making. 
The accusation that Foucault is inconsistent on this point, however, is 
somewhat premature. For, upon closer examination, we see that it is not the 
case that theory in the Hegelian tradition breaks entirely with transcen-
dence. It is not the case that Hegelian truth is subject to total change. Hegel 
does not after all leave Socrates so very far behind. 
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche locates the death of tragic art in the 
rise of Socratic cheerfulness, in the prevalence of the Socratic-Platonic con-
viction that everything ultimately is intelligible. For Socrates there is no 
positivity beyond the domain of intelligible arrangement. There is no Other, 
no Difference, nothing independent of the totalization of rationalistic order. 
It is above all this vision of absolute comprehension, of perfect and ulti-
mately inviolable unity, that ·characterizes and undergirds the Socratic 
world. 
Hegel does not challenge this vision. He simply renames it, identifies 
it, as a whole, with truth itself. The true now is, now means, that ulti-
mately perfectly integrated whole, rather than simply the principles by 
which that whole orders itself. The true comprehends all change, all differ-
ence, all becoming. And all, all, is intelligible. Nothing effectively resists; 
nothing remains without. There is no chaos; there is no madness; there is no 
death. The true permanently excludes the very possibility of radical differ-
ence. Hence, the Hegelian comprehension of history is itself still beyond 
history, still partaking of transcendentality. 
Theory, then, even within the Hegelian tradition, still orders itself ac-
cording to an ahistorical truth. It still measures itself against a transcenden-
tal meter stick. Theoretical discourse still can be conceived as a 
competition in which transhistorical truth plays the part of both referee 
and goal. 
With the thinking of history as his expressed purpose, Foucault cannot 
allow himself to slip into theoretical language; for to do so would be to risk 
the forgetfulness embedded in its terms and the arrogance inherent in its 
vision. The avoidance of theoretical terminology is, therefore, not simply a 
coincidence or the result of some semantic idiosyncracy on Foucault's part. 
It is, on the contrary, an element in a very deliberate strategy aimed at the 
dismantling of transcendental thought. 
Inevitably, a historical thinker runs headlong into truth. We may be 
able to let go of God, to historicize morality, to place the tenets of logic in 
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question, to situate the knowing subject, but truth may still remain un-
moved (its power directly proportionate to our inability to conceive of 
thought without its guidance; its strength of command precisely equivalent 
to our lack of imagination). As Nietzsche recognized, truth is the pillar of 
the temple of ahistorical intelligibility. 
The thinker who would think history must interrogate truth. We must 
bring ourselves up short before the Nietzschean question: ''why not rather 
untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?"6 Is it the case, after all, that 
truth's position in our discourse, in our world, that truth's value, is inevi-
table? Are not other values, other systems of evaluation, equally imagin-
able, equally possible? It is the job of the historical thinker to articulate 
that question, to remember it, to nurture it. For in no other way will 
truth-will theory, will subjectivity or sexuality or power-ever be trans-
valued. 
To undergo the question, "why not rather untruth?" is already to find 
oneself, if only for a brief interval, outside the discourses in which tran-
scendental truth is an ordering principle. The transvaluational thinker must 
find ways to expand that interval, to make it possible to hear the silence 
beyond truth in its positivity, to allow the previously unthinkable to occur. 
And, if possible, one must speak from truth's boundary, truth's discursive 
limit, speak of that limit that theoretical discourse would deny. Foucault's 
discourse must transgress the discourse of truth in such a way as to make its 
transgressive movements audible, visible, felt within truth's own domain. 
It is not overstatement to assert that every one of Foucault's works, the 
very event of Foucaultian discourse, constitutes an attempt to trangress, and 
thereby to transvalue, transhistorical truth. Historical thinking must occur 
as a violation of the transhistorical. And, accordingly, Foucault must refuse 
to employ any structure of articulation that cannot place in question the 
value of truth. 
Theoretical thinking constitutes one such deficient structure of articu-
lation. If Foucault were to think and speak theoretically, his discourse could 
not bring into question the value of truth as ultimate standard or final goal. 
If Foucault were to speak theoretically, he could not speak transgressively; 
he could not speak transvaluatively. To cast Foucault in the role of the the-
orist is to strip his discourse of the power it claims and exercises. It is to 
make nonsense of his entire enterprise. To understand Foucault's work as a 
collection of theories-of the subject, of power, of knowledge-is not to 
understand Foucault's work at all. 
Serious attention to Foucault's work compels us to explore the possi-
bilities opened up by his attempt to expand the transgressive interval, that 
moment at which the boundary, the limit, of transcendental thought be-
comes palpable, comes into view. However, before such exploration can 
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occur, we must have some understanding of the structures of Foucault's dis-
course that enable the event that is that expanding interval, so that we do 
not inadvertently cover it over or cause it to contract. 
One of the most significant and powerful of the transgressive structures 
that Foucault erects is his rigorous nontheory, which complements his in-
sistence that theory be recognized for the ally of transcendentality that it is. 
Theory is one of Foucault's targets. If we are to be historical thinkers, the-
ory must be one of our targets as well. And we must insist that the non-
theoretical, anti-theoretical nature of Foucault's work be acknowledged and 
respected. 
